Efeito do cultivo sob contrato na renda e no risco dos produtores de pistache e açafrão no Irã

Mohammad Mehri Abarghouei, Mahmoud Ahmadpour Borazjani, Hamid Mohammadi, Mashallah Salarpour

Resumo


A agricultura por contrato está entre os arranjos institucionais mais essenciais para os produtos agrícolas. Esses contratos, na maioria dos casos, levam ao aumento da renda e do bem-estar dos agricultores. No entanto, esse tipo de negócio não foi levado a sério no Irã. Este estudo teve como objetivo analisar o efeito da agricultura contratual sobre a renda e o risco da renda do agricultor. Para esse fim, os produtores de pistache e açafrão na província de Yazd, no centro do Irã, foram considerados na safra 2017-2018. Os agricultores foram divididos em três grupos homogêneos, cada um com diferentes níveis de consumo de insumos e produtividade por hectare. Em seguida, as funções de custo dos agricultores representativos foram calibradas em cada grupo. Essas funções foram empregadas para desenvolver um modelo de contrato formal ideal e contrato relacional. De acordo com os resultados, contratos formais e contratos relacionais aumentaram a renda e os contratos relacionais reduziram o risco dos agricultores quando eles eram compatíveis com as restrições de incentivo do produtor e principal. Recomenda-se aos formuladores de políticas que forneçam condições favoráveis ao desenvolvimento da agricultura contratada. Por exemplo, eles podem familiarizar os agricultores com a agricultura contratual e incentivar as empresas agrícolas a participar de contratos, facilitando o acesso ao crédito e outros incentivos ao investimento.


Palavras-chave


contrato formal, contrato relacional, contrato ideal, restrição de incentivo, província de Yazd Classificação JEL: Q1, D4

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.5965/223811711922020204

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Revista de Ciências Agroveterinárias (Rev. Ciênc. Agrovet.), Lages, SC, Brasil        ISSN 2238-1171